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NOTES
A Party That Won’t Spoil

MINOR PARTIES, STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND
FUSION VOTING
*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the 2000 Presidential race 2,882,955 Americans cast
their votes for Ralph Nader, the Green Party candidate.1 When
Republican George W. Bush won a narrow victory, many
argued that Ralph Nader caused Democrat Al Gore’s defeat.2
Nader was deemed a “spoiler.”3 Democratic Party leaders were
angry, and they made that anger public. For instance,
according to one elected Democrat, Nader “divorced himself
from the very ideals that made him a worthwhile political
actor. He sold out his constituency.”4 The anger over the
*

© 2005 Elissa Berger. All Rights Reserved.
See Federal Election Commission, 2000 Official Presidential General
Election Results, at www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last modified Dec.
2001).
2
See, e.g., Sheila R. Cherry, Nader Raids the Democrats, INSIGHT, Dec. 4,
2000, at 24; James Dao, Angry Democrats, Fearing Nader Cost Them the Presidential
Race, Threaten to Retaliate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2000, at B3; The Spoiler, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 17, 2000, at A9. For the argument that, contrary to the
conventional view, Buchanan had a greater impact on the election than Nader, see
David Leonhardt, Was Buchanan the Real Nader?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at 44.
3
See, for example, the news articles listed supra, note 2. A “spoiler” is a
candidate who has no chance of winning, but whose candidacy deprives another of
success. See MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, at www.m-w.com (last visited
May 15, 2005).
4
See Peter DeMarco, D.C. Dems Gore Nader for Crashing the Party, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 30, 2001, at 2 (quoting Rep. Robert Wexler). See also Michael Powell,
1
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outcome of the 2000 race survived the four years between
presidential elections.5 In 2004, Ralph Nader was on the ballot
for president once again, but this time, the Green Party did not
endorse him.6 Party members hoped to avoid new accusations of
spoiling and thought another Nader candidacy would attract
would-be Democratic-voters away from John Kerry.7 Nader ran
without the Green Party endorsement.8 He received only
465,650 votes.9
In most American elections, only two candidates have a
reasonable chance at victory. Minor parties are stuck in a cage
twice locked: they must ask voters either to throw away their
vote and have it not affect the outcome, or to vote and affect the
outcome by “spoiling,” causing the victory of a candidate least
preferred by the minor party constituency.10 Since voting for a
third party candidate casts an insignificant vote or worse (i.e.,
furthers the success of an opponent), third party voting often
seems irrational. The authors of Third Parties in America put
it this way:
To vote for a third party, citizens must repudiate much of what they
have learned and grown to accept as appropriate political behavior,
they must often endure ridicule and harassment from neighbors and
friends, they must pay steep costs to gather information on more

Seared but Unwilted; Democrats See Red. But Green Party Faithful Say They Made
Their Point, WASH. POST, Dec. 27, 2000, at C1 (“Ask the Democrats about Nader and
their rumblings devolve into a rain of invective.”).
5
For instance, in the fall of 2004 S.L. Price wrote an Op-Ed for the New
York Times that began, “As a rule, my friends hate Ralph Nader. The conservative
ones consider him a publicity hound who has it in for corporate America, and the
liberals blame him for putting George W. Bush in the White House.” S.L. Price, Nader’s
Remainders, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2004, at A19.
6
In a blatant snub, the Green Party endorsed Texas attorney David Cobb.
Cobb sought the Green Party nomination with a commitment to campaign in “safe
states” only. See David Finkel, Nader Plays Down Green Party Rebuff, WASH. POST,
June 28, 2004, at A6; Lisa Chamberlain, The Dark Side of Ralph Nader, SALON.COM, at
http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2004/07/01/nader_jacobs/ (July 1, 2004). Nader
won spots on the ballots of more than 30 states. See Susannah Rosenblatt, Nader is
Still on the Radar in Key States, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at A35.
7
See Dan Moffett, Greener Pastures for Ex-Naderites, PALM BEACH POST,
July 4, 2004, at 2E; Norman Solomon, Editorial, Nader Adrift, BALT. SUN, July 1, 2004,
at 15A.
8
Nader ran as an independent candidate. In some states, he was able to get
on the ballot line of a statewide minor party. See Michael Janofsky, Nader Presses On,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at G2.
9
See Federal Election Commission, Federal Elections 2004 (May 2005), at
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.pdf.
10
See LISA JANE DISCH, THE TYRANNY OF THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM 127-28
(2002).
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obscure candidates, and they must accept that their candidate has
no hope of winning.11

Nonetheless, people sometimes choose to vote on a
minor party ballot line to send a message about their
frustration with the two major parties and their candidates.12
This is probably why 2.8 million people voted for Nader in
2000.13 The risk of “spoiling” or “wasting votes,” however,
makes it hard for minor parties and independent candidates to
consistently secure voters’ support at the ballot box, even if
voters remain committed to the party and candidate’s
ideology.14 This is probably why 2.4 million fewer voters chose
to vote for Nader in 2004 than in 2000.15
If minor parties are allowed to endorse major party
candidates, they could be effectively released from their
political cage. Imagine a closely contested race between a
Democrat (candidate X) and a Republican (candidate Y). A
minor party, the Purple Party, endorses candidate X. The
ballot has a column for each political party and in each column
the name of that party’s nominee is printed. Candidate X, then,
is listed twice. (See Appendix for a sample ballot.) Those who
prefer candidate X to candidate Y can vote on either the
Democratic or the Purple party ballot line for candidate X.
Let’s say the Purple Party platform strongly supports
the right of same-sex couples to marry. A voter, who similarly
supports gay marriage, hopes candidate X will win the election,
but is frustrated with the way candidate X and the Democratic
Party avoid the issue of same-sex marriage. Our hypothetical
voter would be able to cast her vote for both the candidate she
prefers and the political party she feels best represents her

11

See STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE ET AL., THIRD PARTIES IN AMERICA 3 (2d ed.

1996).
12

Id. at 9.
See, e.g., James Dao, The 2000 Election: The Green Party, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2000, at A29 (quoting voters as saying “I voted for Nader because he was most
aligned with my values” and “I voted my conscience”).
14
See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 81, 174-75 (explaining modern
minor parties fielding their own candidates rarely last more than two election cycles).
15
Television host Bill Maher, who voted for Nader in 2000, explained his
switch in 2004 this way: “We all got a little reality slapped into us by George W. Bush .
. . . I see [voting for Nader] as a bratty thing to have done.” See Tom Shales, Bill
Maher: Back for More, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2004, at C1. Former Nader supporter
Ronnie Dugger changed his position after the 2000 election and described Nader’s
second presidential candidacy as a mistake in strategy and harmful to the progressive
values he and Nader share. See Ronnie Dugger, Ralph, Don’t Run, NATION MAG., Dec.
2, 2002, at 14.
13
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views. This practice—voting for candidates that are endorsed
by more than one political party—is known as fusion voting.
In a fusion voting system, a single candidate can be
nominated to run on more than one party’s ballot line.16 All
votes for that candidate are added together to determine
whether the candidate wins a majority of votes, regardless of
the ballot line on which the vote was cast. But each party’s
votes are also tallied separately, so the election results reflect
each party’s contribution to the candidate’s electoral success.
Minor parties are able to influence the outcome of elections
even when they do not field a viable candidate of their own.17
They can endorse a candidate who has a reasonable chance of
victory, while also demonstrating that voters support their
platform.18 Likewise, voters are able to express their support for
the party’s principles, while avoiding the danger that their vote
has been wasted in symbolic protest. As one pro-fusion party
has boasted, fusion voting makes one vote count twice—first it
sends a message about the issues the voter cares about and
then it helps elect a candidate.19

16

The broadest definition of fusion voting would include ballot rules that
allow more than one party to be listed as endorsing a single candidate, but only list a
candidate once. Returning to our previous hypothetical, this would mean that
candidate X would be listed under a column labeled Democrat and Purple Party, and
candidate Y would be listed under a column labeled Republican. For the sake of this
note, I use fusion voting to mean a system where each party would have its own ballot
line. For an argument that any other kind of fusion voting scheme is unconstitutional,
see Note, Fusion Candidacies, Disaggregation, and Freedom of Association, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1302 (1996).
17
Of course, in a fusion voting system, minor parties could choose to run
their own candidate if they felt so motivated. When fusion parties proliferated in
America, minor parties often debated whether they should endorse a major party
candidate or run an independent candidate. See DISCH, supra note 10, at 53-54.
Generally, fielding a minor party candidate was a move of last resort. See ROSENSTONE
ET AL., supra note 11, at 79. However, just the threat of not receiving a minor party
endorsement kept major parties on their toes. Major party candidates would adopt
parts of minor party platforms in order to secure the votes of minor party adherents.
See DISCH, supra note 10, at 41.
18
A party’s strong showing at the polls could translate into influence on
policy. Returning to our hypothetical candidate after Election Day illustrates this
point. Imagine Candidate Y receives 48% of the vote, more votes than Candidate X
receives on the Democrat ballot line. However, when all votes are tallied, Candidate X
is elected with 52% of the vote—44% from the votes on the Democratic ballot line, and
8% of the votes from the Purple Party ballot line. (See Appendix for hypothetical
election results.) Candidate X assumes her elected office knowing that she would not
have won without the Purple Party’s support. Since she is constantly thinking about
the future of her political career, she looks to the Purple Party’s platform and
incorporates it into her policy agenda. For real world examples of this, see infra notes
79-82 and accompanying text.
19
Working Families Party Campaign Literature (on file with the author).
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Unfortunately for minor parties, fusion voting is illegal
in most states.20 And in spite of the burden anti-fusion laws
place on minor parties’ freedom of association, the U.S.
Supreme Court has upheld state bans on fusion voting.21 But
when the Supreme Court closes a door, state constitutions may
provide an open window.22
This Note argues that state anti-fusion laws violate the
rights granted to political parties and voters under state
constitutions. Part II of this Note describes the role of minor
parties in American politics and briefly sketches the history of
fusion voting in America. Part III summarizes the Supreme
Court’s approach to the rights of political parties and discusses
Twin Cities Area New Party v. Timmons,23 in which the
Supreme Court upheld Minnesota’s fusion ban. Part IV argues
that state courts can strike down anti-fusion laws based on
state constitutional rights.
II.

MINOR PARTIES AND FUSION VOTING

Increasingly,
voters
identify
themselves
as
“independent” and voter registration information suggests
Americans want more than the Democrats and Republicans
have to offer.24 Third parties would provide more variety in the
political landscape if allowed to thrive.25 Minor parties broaden
20

STEVE COBBLE & SARAH SISKIND, FUSION: MULTIPLE PARTY NOMINATION IN
UNITED STATES 9-45 (Center for a New Democracy 1983), available at http://www.
nmef.org/cobble_siskind.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (describing each state’s laws as
they relate to fusion voting). Cobble and Siskind categorize twenty-five states as
having statutes that explicitly prohibit fusion voting. They list another fifteen states
and the District of Columbia that require candidates be members of the political party
that has nominated them, thereby indirectly prohibiting fusion voting. See id. Since
Cobble and Siskind published their research, Arkansas and Utah enacted anti-fusion
laws, raising the count of states with direct bans on fusion to twenty-seven. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 7-7-204 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-9-201 (2)(a)(ii) (2004). See also
Noel E. Oman, One-Party-at-a-Time, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1997, at 4B;
Utah Attacks Fusion, 13 BALLOT ACCESS NEWS 11 (Feb. 8, 1998), available at
http://www.ballot-access.org/1998/0208.html.
21
See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
(upholding Minnesota’s anti-fusion law). The Supreme Court recognized that antifusion laws imposed burdens on a minor party’s First Amendment associational rights
and that while these burdens were not severe, neither were they trivial. See id. at 363.
22
See infra Part IV.A.
23
See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363.
24
See Over 25% of Voters Are Not Registered Dems or Reps, 19 BALLOT
ACCESS NEWS 10 (Feb. 1, 2004), available at http://www.ballot-access.org/2004/
0201.html. See also MICAH L. SIFRY, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT: THIRD PARTY POLITICS IN
AMERICA 49 (2002) (summarizing data from the Committee for the Study of the
American Electorate, National Election Studies, and various state sources).
25
See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 114-41 (1957)
THE
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the debate; they raise issues that the major parties refuse to
address.26 The abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage, for
instance, first found homes in the platforms of minor parties.27
With more choices at the ballot box, voter participation would
likely increase.28 And with more viable parties, resulting
competition might make major parties more responsive and
accountable to voters.29
Contemporary politics in the United States, however, is
a game with only two teams: the Democrats and the
Republicans.30 Minor parties watch from the sidelines rather
than play on the field. Candidates running solely on minor
party ballot lines barely make a blip on election return charts
unless they have extreme wealth or celebrity status.31
Moreover, when non-major party candidates have the
opportunity to impact an election, that impact is often
considered destructive. On learning of Ralph Nader’s intent to
run in 2004, for example, progressive commentators predicted
“mind-boggling irrelevance—but with a potential for
catastrophic mischief.”32
(explaining that when there are only two political parties, their platforms tend to
reflect the center of the political spectrum).
26
See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 221-23.
27
See id. at 8; SIFRY, supra note 24, at 8.
28
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 53. Cf. Arend Lijiphart, Unequal Participation:
Democracy’s Unresolved Dilemma, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1, 7 (1996) (suggesting
multiple parties in a proportional representation system would increase voter turnout
because it would give “voters more choices and . . . [eliminate] the problem of wasted
votes”).
29
See Richard L. Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court
Should Not Allow The States to Protect the Democrats and Republicans From Political
Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 344 (“Without third parties to challenge the
positions of the two major parties and their candidates, the major parties are likely to
become (some would say, remain) complacent and unresponsive to social pressures and
movements.”).
30
Disch notes Americans would never accept only two options as consumers,
but they seem to accept such limited choices as voters. See DISCH, supra note 10, at 7.
Hasen similarly suggests the absence of marketplace competition results in poor
representation by the party duopoly. See Hasen, supra note 29, at 344. And Sifry quips,
“For a country that prides itself as the heartland of free market capitalism, this lack of
competition in the political arena is not just perverse. It is positively unhealthy.” See
SIFRY, supra note 24, at 7.
31
Reform Party candidate Jesse Ventura became Minnesota Governor in
1998 because of his celebrity status and Minnesota’s public financing laws. See DISCH,
supra note 10, at 1-4; SIFRY, supra note 24, at 42. Similarly, presidential candidate
Ross Perot was able to garner 19% of the popular vote because he was independently
wealthy. See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 3. On the high cost of even getting an
independent candidate on the ballot, let alone garnering votes, see Samuel Issacharoff,
Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643,
687 (1998).
32
Harold Meyerson et al., He’s Back: Nader is running for president again.
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Minor parties have not always been in this predicament.
They used to play a major role in American elections.33 Up until
the early 1900s, minor parties could endorse major party
candidates34 and the same candidate could appear more than
once on the ballot.35 Voters could vote for a candidate on the
ballot line of whichever party appealed to them most. When
votes were tallied, minor parties simultaneously helped elect
candidates to office and demonstrated the parties’ own
popularity at the polls. Votes translated into power over elected
officials who wanted to run for reelection with minor parties’
endorsements.36 Major parties, too, watched closely the votes
that minor parties garnered. Key issues of vote-getting minor
parties would be absorbed into major party platforms.37 The
ability of minor parties to “fuse” their endorsements with major
parties’ endorsements “[guaranteed] that dissenters’ votes
could be more than symbolic protest, that their leaders could
gain office, and that their demands might be heard.”38
The decline of fusion voting began when state
governments took charge of elections. In the 19th century,
political parties controlled the electoral process. Parties
themselves used to be responsible for printing ballots listing
their slate of candidates.39 As voters went to the polls, party
activists would pass out party tickets.40 Casting a vote was as
simple as dropping the ticket into the ballot box.41 The
simplicity of this process created opportunities for corruption.
For example, without government regulation, voters could be
tricked into casting their vote on what they thought was a
Four reasons why this is a big mistake, AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE, Feb. 23, 2004,
available at http://www.prospect.org/webfeatures/2004/02/meyerson-h-02-23.html.
33
th
During the 19 Century, both the Democrats and Republicans were
considered “major” parties but neither was a “majority” party. They won elections by
forming coalitions with minor parties. See Peter H. Argersinger, A Place on the Ballot:
Fusion Politics and Antifusion Laws, 85 AM. HIST. REV. 287, 288-89 (1980).
34
Id. at 288-89.
35
It might be more accurate to say that the same candidate could appear on
more than one party’s ballot—ballots were printed by political parties, not by the
government. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
36
See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 80 (“After several elections,
either the conditions that originally precipitated the parties’ formation disappeared, or
one of the major parties took up the third parties’ cause.”).
37
See id. at 8, 43-44.
38
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 288-89.
39
See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19-20.
40
See id.
41
See id.; Argersinger, supra note 33, at 291. If a voter wanted to vote for
candidates of different parties (ticket-splitting), he could write his preferred choice on
any parties’ ticket. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 20.
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Republican ballot, but was actually a listing of Democratic
candidates.42 Moreover, different parties’ ballots were different
sizes and colors.43 Onlookers could see by the ballot in voters’
hands for whom they were voting.44 The 1888 presidential
campaign seemed particularly crooked.45 It proved a catalyst for
states to adopt the Australian system of secret ballot.46
Under the Australian ballot system, state governments
started printing ballots.47 State printed ballots protected the
privacy of voters’ choices—every ballot looked the same.48 In
addition, the new voting system eliminated the distribution of
ballots that looked like the slate of one party but actually listed
the candidates of another party.49
The new system brought the need for new rules.
Procedures were required to decide which candidates’ names
would be printed on the ballot.50 As part of the new laws,
legislators delivered a near fatal blow to minor parties,
enacting anti-fusion rules that prohibited multiple parties from
endorsing the same candidate.51
While most of the Australian ballot laws were enacted
to rid the electoral process of corruption, anti-fusion laws had a
less noble motivation.52 The electoral successes of fusion tickets
threatened some lawmakers. Majority Republican legislatures
were first to realize they could use the trend of ballot reform to
remove a tool that often benefited their rivals.53 In 1893, South
42

See, e.g., Daniel v. Simms, 39 S.E. 690, 694 (W. Va. 1901) (decrying the
vulnerability of the old system in which “[a] voter, coming upon the ground and
desiring to vote the Democratic ticket, might have one of these fraudulent tickets
placed in his hands, and, without examining it closely, deposit it, and thus be
defrauded out of his vote as to that particular office in which he felt most deeply
interested”).
43
See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19-20.
44
See id. at 19-20.
45
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 290-91.
46
See id.
47
See generally LIONEL E. FREDMAN, THE AUSTRALIAN BALLOT: THE STORY
OF AN AMERICAN REFORM (1968).
48
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 290-91.
49
See id.
50
See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 20.
51
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 291.
52
See id. at 292 (“[T]he [anti-fusion] law . . . was intended to promote the
dissolution of party ties while giving Republicans the residual benefits of them.”). In
addition to anti-fusion laws, other mean-spirited laws were included in states’ reform
packages. It was during this time that legislators instituted poll taxes and literacy
tests with the goal of disenfranchising African Americans. See Paul R. Petterson,
Partisan Autonomy or State Regulatory Authority? The Court as Mediator, in THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 113-14 (David K. Reyden ed., 2d ed.
2002).
53
See Brief for the Respondent at 7, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608);
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Dakota lawmakers enacted the first anti-fusion law, preventing
a candidate from being listed more than once on a ballot.54
Oregon, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio passed analogous laws
in 1895.55 By 1899, eight more states had passed anti-fusion
laws.56 All were passed by majority Republican legislatures,
whose members wanted to prevent the cooperation between
57
A Michigan lawmaker
Democrats and minor parties.
forthrightly declared, “We don’t propose to allow the Democrats
to make allies of the Populists, Prohibitionists, or any other
party, and get up combination tickets against us. We can whip
them single-handed, but don’t intend to fight all creation.”58
Legislators were rarely so blunt. Most defended antifusion laws as good-government reform.59 But the actual
motivation for these laws was not lost on one journalist, who
renamed the anti-fusion law “the law providing for the
extinction and effacement of all parties but the Democratic and
Republican.”60 Nor was the partisan motivation lost on
Democratic or minor party members.61 A Populist Party
member declared that the anti-fusion law “practically
disfranchises every citizen who does not happen to be a
member of the party in power . . . . They are thus compelled to
either lose their vote . . . or else to unite in one organization. It
would mean that there could only be two parties at one time.”62
Without fusion, what once was an effective way to express a
voter’s ideology now became a wasted gesture—a throwaway
vote. Unsurprisingly, voters stopped voting for minor parties,
ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 48-80; Argersinger, supra note 33, at 289-90.
Fusion voting was most common in the Midwest and West where Republicans more
often were in control of the state legislatures. See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 28990. Several eastern states did not immediately pass anti-fusion laws because the major
parties were strong enough to prevent support for minor parties without legislating
against them. See ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 20 n.5 (noting the following
states’ history of fusion: Maryland, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Connecticut). Except for Connecticut, each of these states has since enacted anti-fusion
laws. See COBBLE & SISKIND, supra note 20, at 8.
54
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 297.
55
See id. at 298-301.
56
See id. at 302 (listing the following states as having enacted anti-fusion
laws: California, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, North Dakota, Pennsylvania,
Wisconsin and Wyoming).
57
See id. at 302-03.
58
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 296 (quoting DETROIT FREE PRESS, Feb.
1, Jan. 5, 1893).
59
See id. at 292.
60
See id. at 304.
61
See id. at 302; DISCH, supra note 10, at 52.
62
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 304 (quoting KALAMAZOO WEEKLY
TELEGRAPH, Mar. 20, 1895).
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and the parties were forced to the sidelines of American
politics.63
Today, anti-fusion laws exist in all but eight states.64 In
the states that allow fusion voting, seven have laws or party
rules that make it difficult, if not impossible to establish a
statewide fusion party.65 For instance, Connecticut laws allow a
candidate to be endorsed by more than one official political
party in a given election,66 but to become an official political
party, with the ability to endorse candidates in all Connecticut
elections, the party must run an independent candidate in a
gubernatorial race and win 20% of the vote.67 New parties,
without official status, cannot endorse candidates already
nominated by existing parties.68 Winning 20% of the vote in a
statewide election with an independent candidate is difficult.
More importantly, it is unlikely a pro-fusion party would want
63

See Brief of Amici Curiae of Twelve University Professors and Center For
A New Democracy In Support of Respondent Twin Cities Area New Party, Timmons,
520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608); ROSENSTONE ET AL., supra note 11, at 149.
64
The eight states are Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Mississippi, New York,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Vermont. See supra note 20 and accompanying
text.
65
See COBBLE & SISKIND, supra note 20, at 10-45 (describing major party
rules and election laws that may make fusion voting difficult in states that do not have
anti-fusion laws).
66
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453t (2003) (“Nothing in this section shall be
construed to prohibit any candidate from appearing on the ballot as the nominee of two
or more major or minor parties for the same office.”).
67
Parties retain official status across the entire state when they win 20% of
the vote for governor or have registered 20% of voters. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-372(5)
(2003) (“‘Major party’ means (A) a political party or organization whose candidate for
Governor at the last-preceding election for Governor received, under the designation of
that political party or organization, at least twenty per cent of the whole number of
votes cast for all candidates for Governor, or (B) a political party having, at the lastpreceding election for Governor, a number of enrolled members on the active registry
list equal to at least twenty per cent of the total number of enrolled members of all
political parties on the active registry list in the state”); Parties who win 1% of the vote
in a given election only have party status in that district, for that office. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 9-372(6) (“‘Minor party’ means a political party or organization which is
not a major party and whose candidate for the office in question received at the lastpreceding regular election for such office, under the designation of that political party
or organization, at least one per cent of the whole number of votes cast for all
candidates for such office at such election.”).
68
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-453t (2003) (“[T]he nomination of a candidate by
a major or minor party under this chapter, for any office shall disqualify such
candidate from appearing on the ballot by nominating petition for the same office.”). If
a party does not have official status, it must nominate its candidate through the
petitioning process, thereby precluding the nomination of a candidate supported by an
official political party. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-379 (2003) (“No name of any candidate
shall be printed on any official ballot at any election except the name of a candidate
nominated by a major or minor party unless a nominating petition for such candidate
is approved by the Secretary of the State as provided in sections 9-453a to 9-453p,
inclusive.”).
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to risk spoiling in its election debut.69 Therefore, establishing a
fusion party through a statewide election in Connecticut is
almost impossible.70
New York is the only state in the nation where fusion
voting has remained a common practice.71 As a result, minor
parties have thrived.72 Currently, three minor parties have
official party status in New York state.73 In one recent election,
minor parties captured more than 20% of the total vote.74 In
New York’s local, statewide and federal elections, minor
parties’ vote totals have tipped major party candidates to
victory. Rudolph Guiliani, for example, became mayor of New
York City only because the votes he won on the Liberal Party
ballot line were added to the votes he won on the Republican
Party ballot line.75 George Pataki was able to secure the
governorship only by adding the votes cast on the Conservative
Party line to the votes cast on the Republican Party line.76
Similarly, New York’s Electoral College votes have been
determined by minor party votes: neither Franklin D.
Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy nor Ronald Reagan would have
69

See Lee Foster, 3rd Party Planting Roots in State, HARTFORD COURANT,
Oct. 6, 2004, at B1 (reporting that one Working Families Party candidate dropped out
“to avoid stealing votes” from the Democratic candidate in a closely contested state
senate race).
70
However, a new party that has won 1% of the vote for an independent
candidate in a non-statewide election is able to “fuse” endorsements with other parties
the next time that local office is up for election. Winning 1% of the vote in a local
election is more achievable and strategically less problematic than winning 20% of the
vote in a statewide election. Activists in Connecticut are running independent
candidates in local races, and have achieved official party status in at least 66 districts.
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 297; Gail Ellen Daly, Working Families Happy With
Results, CHRONICLE (Willimantic, Conn.) (Nov. 5 2004), available at http://www.ctworkingfamilies.org/WCPleased.html (last visited May 15, 2005).
71
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 228-89.
72
See Brief of the Conservative Party of New York and Liberal Party of New
York as Amici Curie in Support of Respondent at 13, Timmons (No. 95-1608).
73
See NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Running for Office, at
http://www.elections.state.ny.us/portal/page?_pageid=153,42096,153_53318:153_53330
&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (last visited Apr. 14, 2005) (“The current political
parties are the Republican, Democratic, Independence, Conservative, and Working
Families parties.”). For official party status, minor parties must win 50,000 votes each
gubernatorial election. See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 1-104 (McKinney 2005). In 2002, the
Independence Party, the Conservative Party and the Working Families Party met and
surpassed that threshold. See Erik Kris, Some Minor Parties Lost Automatic Ballot
Status, POST-STANDARD (Syracuse), Nov. 7, 2002, at A14.
74
The minor party vote in three recent statewide elections are as follows: in
2004 U.S. Presidential race, 5%; 2004 U.S. Senate race, 9%; 2002 Gubernatorial race,
22%. Elections results are available from the New York State Board of Elections at
www.elections.state.ny.us.
75
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 228-29.
76
See id.
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carried New York by the votes cast on major party lines alone.77
Each of them needed the votes that were cast on the minor
party lines to win New York.
New York’s minor parties do not only influence the
outcome of specific elections; their success at the polls also
leads to influence over politicians in office.78 The Conservative
Party, for example, pressures Republican legislators to oppose
abortion and gay rights with threats of running independent
challengers against Republican incumbents.79 The Working
Families Party has also linked its possession of a ballot line to
policy gains. For instance, a few months after the Working
Families Party helped elect a Democrat to the Suffolk County
legislature, the county enacted a living wage law, a legislative
priority for the Working Families Party.80 The Working
Families Party believes that members of the county legislature
saw the decisive part the minor party played in the election
and thought of their own upcoming reelections when passing
the living wage bill.81 Highlighting the importance of fusion
voting in this legislative victory, Daniel Cantor, executive
director of the Working Families Party had this to say:
The ability to clearly demonstrate a minor party’s electoral strength
via the fusion vote was absolutely essential to winning the living
wage in Suffolk. In fact, it’s no overstatement to suggest that the 210
votes we got on our line that proved the “margin of victory” in one
legislative race resulted in 4,000 low-wage workers getting an
increase in salary of nearly $2,000 per year. That’s the power of
fusion.82

77

See id. at 229.
See DANIEL A. MAZMANIAN, THIRD PARTIES IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
130-32 (1974) (describing the impact fusion parties have had on the direction of New
York policy).
79
Richard Perz-Pena, Despite Size Conservative Party is a Force to Reckon
With, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1999, at B1.
80
See, e.g., Emi Endo, Working Families Party is Working For Influence,
NEWSDAY, July 19, 2001, at A33; Amy Waldman, New Party is Courting Liberal
Constituencies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1998, at 44.
81
See WORKING FAMILIES PARTY, Fusion Voting—Our (Not So) Secret
Weapon, at http://www.workingfamiliesparty.org/fusion.html (last visited Apr. 14,
2005) (“Every member of the Republican controlled County Legislature noticed the
WFP’s role in the Lindsay victory. They were soon up for reelection and realized the
importance of appealing to our voters. So, they decided to pass the [living wage] bill.”);
See also Michael Tomasky, Inside Agitators, N.Y. MAG., Mar. 4, 2002 (“The 210 votes
William Lindsay got on the WFP line provided his margin of victory. For a small party,
that means leverage, which the WFP converted into the passage of living-wage
legislation in Suffolk.”).
82
E-mail from Daniel Cantor, Executive Director, Working Families Party, to
author (Dec. 15, 2004) (on file with author).
78
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Inspired by the successes of minor parties in New York,
a few pragmatic idealists began thinking about how to export
the New York model to other states in the late 1980s.83 Joel
Rogers, a political science professor at the University of
Wisconsin, and Daniel Cantor, then a political organizer in
New York, believed that American democracy would be
improved if minor parties had a stronger voice in politics.84
They recognized, however, the political irrelevancy of modern
minor parties. The solution was simple: fusion.85 The solution to
state anti-fusion laws was also simple: sue.86
Joel Rogers and Daniel Cantor spent the next few years
building the “New Party,” a progressive political party that
they hoped would win a ballot line by challenging the
constitutionality of anti-fusion laws.87 The New Party’s strategy
was to build a grassroots, membership base while planning
litigation.88 The party’s motto was fitting: “Start Small. Think
Big.”89 They were confident that their day in court would result
in victory. They were wrong.90
III.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND ANTI-FUSION LAWS

The New Party sought to challenge anti-fusion laws on
First Amendment grounds. The First Amendment of the
federal Constitution can be construed to protect fusion voting
in two ways. First, voting might be seen as expression of
political views, and thus protected by the right to freedom of
expression. Fusion voting is a means by which voters and
parties can critique the major parties’ position on issues and
83

See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 228-31.
See id. at 229-30. According to a 1999 memorandum, Cantor and Rogers
believed that the major parties offered progressives “a ‘devil’s bargain’ . . . in which
support is generally exchanged for frustration” but “that the history of third party
alternatives seems even more grim.” Creating a new political party with the power to
endorse major party candidates would “give voice to [progressives’] political aspiration
in ways that matter in conventional electoral arenas.” See Memorandum from Dan
Cantor & Joel Rogers, Party Time, 7, 8, 12 (May 1990) (on file with author).
85
See Cantor & Rogers, Party Time, supra note 84, at 10-11.
86
See Memorandum from Dan Cantor & Joel Rogers, Sue!, 1-2 (May 1990)
(on file with author).
87
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 231-32.
88
See id. at 230-31; Cantor & Rogers, Party Time, supra note 84.
89
A different phrase captures the New Party’s grassroots message: “It’s
about people. It’s about democracy. It’s about time.” See New Party paraphernalia (on
file with the author).
90
They were at least part wrong. They had some initial success, but the
Supreme Court ruled against their challenge to anti-fusion laws in Timmons. See infra
notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
84
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anti-fusion laws limit this expression. Second, activities of
political parties are activities of individuals associating with
each other for a common purpose, and as such might be
protected by the right to freedom of association to achieve
expressive goals. Preventing a minor party from endorsing a
major party candidate could be seen as interfering with the
party’s core functions. This section will summarize the federal
jurisprudence on these two claims, and then discuss Timmons
v. Twin Cities Area New Party,91 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled against the New Party’s constitutional challenge to
anti-fusion laws.
Checking a box, pulling a lever, punching out a chad, or
touching a screen in the ballot booth is a statement of belief as
well as a declaration of preference.92 The U.S. Constitution
protects the right to participate in elections as part of the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,93 but
voting may also be understood to be protected by the right to
freedom of expression as guaranteed in the First Amendment.94
An election marks the temporary end of a political debate and
casting a vote is the “official expression of [a voter’s] judgment
on issues of public policy.”95 Denying the ability of multiple
political parties to endorse a single candidate denies voters the
opportunity of using the ballot to communicate their opinions
effectively on their government’s course of action.
Although this argument may be philosophically
compelling, the Supreme Court rejected the concept of ballot
based expression in Burdick v. Takushi.96 In that case, the
Court considered whether a state could prohibit voters from
writing in names of preferred candidates who did not appear on
the printed ballot.97 Several lower federal courts had previously
91

520 U.S. 351 (1997).
See generally Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV.
330 (1993) (arguing that the right to vote should be protected because of the expressive
function voting serves).
93
See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)
(holding a resident of a school board district who did not own property and did not have
children in the public schools could not be excluded from school board elections). The
federal Constitution explicitly prohibits certain denials of the right to vote in the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments. See generally
DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 71 (3d ed. 2004).
94
See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 256.
95
Id.
96
504 U.S. 428 (1992).
97
Id.
92
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concluded that write-in votes were a form of political
expression and therefore protected by the First Amendment.98
In Burdick, the Supreme Court dismissed this view, declaring
that “the function of the election process is ‘to winnow out and
finally reject all but the chosen candidates,’ not to provide a
means of giving vent to ‘short-range political goals, pique, or
personal quarrel[s].’”99 The Court concluded that treating voting
as an act of expression would “undermine the ability of States
to operate elections fairly and efficiently.”100 Given Supreme
Court precedent, the New Party rested its argument against
anti-fusion laws on parties’ freedom of association rights,
rather than on individuals’ expressive rights.101
The Supreme Court first formally announced that the
constitution protected associational rights in 1958.102 In NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, a unanimous Court held that
Alabama could not require the NAACP to provide its
membership list to the state Attorney General because to do so
would offend the NAACP’s right of association.103 The Court
based the right of association in the right of expression,
declaring that protecting effective advocacy requires protecting
the right of individuals to act collectively.104 In Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, the Court further explained that the right to
associate was an extension of other First Amendment
freedoms.105 The Court said the “freedom to speak, to worship,
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State
unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends were not also guaranteed.”106 Associations formed

98

See Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd., 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989);
Paul v. Indiana Election Bd., 743 F. Supp. 616 (S.D. Ind. 1990); Burdick v. Takushi,
737 F. Supp. 582 (D. Haw. 1990).
99
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735
(1972)).
100
Id.
101
The New Party did argue that the ballot serves an expressive function, but
it made the argument from the perspective of a party, not an individual voter. See Brief
for the Respondent at 25, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608) (“[T]he fusion ban
interferes with the message sent to voters by the party, in the voting booth, that it has
nominated a particular candidate, and it does so despite the fact that the State
otherwise uses its ballot system for precisely this purpose.”).
102
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
103
See id. at 462-63.
104
See id. at 460-61.
105
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
106
Id. at 622.
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with the purpose of engaging in activity protected by the First
Amendment have been termed “expressive associations.”107
The rights of political parties as expressive associations
can run headlong into state regulations of elections.108 The U.S.
Constitution charges state governments with regulating federal
elections,109 and the Court has implied that states have a duty
to ensure all elections are fair and honest.110 Therefore, when
faced with a law that infringes on the rights of political parties,
the Court will balance the interest of the state in regulating
elections against the burden on the party’s rights of
association.111 The “rigorousness of [the Court’s] inquiry into the
propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to
which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.”112 Only regulations that severely burden
those rights must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling
state interest. A state can justify less serious infringements on
associational freedom by showing a regulation furthered
important interests.113
Prior to Timmons, the Supreme Court had applied this
balancing test and struck down several state laws involving
major parties’ associational rights. The Court had held that
states cannot require parties to use a closed primary system,114
107

See Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive
Associations and the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1487 (2001).
108
For a discussion of how political parties fit within the expressive
association framework, see id. The First Amendment applies to state action by way of
the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The first case to recognize that
First Amendment rights are incorporated into the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
109
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
110
See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[T]here must be a
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972) (“[A] State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect the
integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.”).
111
The balancing test was articulated in Anderson v. Celebrezze:
[The Court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by
its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the
legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a
position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional.
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
112
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
113
Id.
114
Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208 (1996). A closed
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prohibit parties from endorsing candidates in primary
elections115 or compel parties to accept state delegates to a
national convention who were not selected according to party
rules.116 In these decisions, the Court established that the right
of association meant “not only that an individual voter has the
right to associate with the political party of her choice, but also
that a political party has a right to identify the people who
constitute the association, and to select a standard bearer who
best represents the party’s ideologies and preferences.”117
The cases decided in the decades before Timmons also
suggested that limiting ballot access for independent
candidates might be especially hard for states to justify.118 One
of the earliest cases about a minor party candidate proved to
contain the strongest language. In Williams v. Rhodes, the
Court considered an Ohio law that required a party to gather
signatures from 10% of Ohio voters in order to secure a space
on the ballot.119 The Court struck the law because “[n]ew parties
struggling for their place must have the time and opportunity
to organize in order to meet reasonable requirements for ballot
position, just as the old parties have had in the past.”120 The
Court dismissed the state’s argument that this law was
justified out of protection for the two-party system:
[T]he Ohio system does not merely favor a “two-party system”; it
favors two particular parties—the Republicans and the Democrats—
and in effect tends to give them a complete monopoly. There is, of
course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent
monopoly on the right to have people vote for or against them.
Competition in ideas and governmental policies is at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms.121

New Party members’ analysis of this precedent left
them feeling optimistic. Insofar as anti-fusion laws prevented
primary would mean only party members would be allowed to vote in the party
primary. See id. at 215.
115
Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223-24
(1989).
116
Democratic Party of the Untied States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
117
Eu, 489 U.S. at 224 (internal citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
118
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (holding Ohio’s filing deadline
for petitions were too early); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 134 (holding Texas’ filing fees were
excessive); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (holding Ohio’s requirement for
petitions signatures were too high).
119
Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.
120
Id. at 32.
121
Id.
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parties from endorsing the candidate of the party’s choosing
simply because another party had already nominated that
candidate, they seemed vulnerable to First Amendment
challenges. Given the particular burden anti-fusion laws placed
on minor parties, the laws would seem especially difficult for a
state to justify. In the words of Professor Theodore Lowi, the
case “look[ed] like a constitutional no-brainer.”122
The first federal court challenge to anti-fusion laws took
place in the Western District of Wisconsin.123 There, the district
court upheld Wisconsin’s ban on fusion voting, and the Seventh
Circuit affirmed.124 Several years later, a district court in
Minnesota also upheld an anti-fusion voting law, but this
decision was reversed by the Eighth Circuit.125 The Supreme
Court then reversed the Eighth Circuit in Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party.126
Timmons considered the right of the New Party to
nominate a candidate for Minnesota State Representative
previously nominated by the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party.127
The candidate, Andy Dawkins, wanted to run with the
endorsements of both the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party and
the New Party.128 The Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party raised
no objection to the New Party’s endorsement.129 When the New
Party attempted to file the petition to nominate Dawkins,
county officials refused to accept the nomination130 because
Minnesota’s anti-fusion laws prevent a candidate from being
twice nominated.131
122

Theodore J. Lowi, Editorial, Supreme Court Should Ban Fusion Tickets,
PLAIN DEALER, Dec. 31, 1996, at 9B.
123
Swamp v. Kennedy, 950 F.2d 383 (7th Cir. 1991).
124
See id.
125
See Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 73 F.3d 196, 200 (8th Cir.
1996).
126
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 370.
127
See id. at 354. In Minnesota the two major parties are the DemocraticFarmer-Labor Party and the Republican Party. Id. at 354 n.2.
128
Id. at 354.
129
Id.
130
Twin Cities Area New Party v. McKenna, 863 F. Supp. 988, 990 (D. Minn.
1994).
131
Minnesota statute provides:
(1) Major party candidates. No individual shall be named on any ballot as the
candidate of more than one major political party. No individual who has
been certified by a canvassing board as the nominee of any major political
party shall be named on any ballot as the candidate of any other major
political party at the next ensuing general election.
(2) Candidates seeking nomination by primary. No individual who seeks
nomination for any partisan or nonpartisan office at a primary shall be
nominated for the same office by nominating petition, except as otherwise
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The New Party filed a complaint in district court
alleging a violation of the party’s associational rights as
guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.132 The
court granted summary judgment in favor of Minnesota,
rejecting the minor party’s claim that the state’s anti-fusion
law was unconstitutional.133 The Court of Appeals reversed that
decision, finding that the fusion ban created a severe burden on
minor parties’ associational rights and that the state could
have enacted a more narrowly tailored law to achieve its
goals.134 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a 6-3
decision, reversed the Court of Appeals.135
The New Party argued that the anti-fusion law severely
burdened its associational rights because it prohibited the
party from nominating its preferred candidate.136 It claimed
that “[n]othing is more fundamental to a party than the choice
of candidates to represent it in electoral competition. Nothing
is more important to a party’s ability to mobilize its supporters
around candidates than its ability to identify those candidates,
on the ballot, as its own.”137
The Supreme Court’s majority opinion, authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, recognized that political parties are
guaranteed associational rights under the First Amendment.
Those rights, however, could be limited by state laws
138
To
reasonably regulating parties, elections and ballots.
determine if the New Party’s rights were violated, the Court
engaged in a balancing test, “weigh[ing] the ‘character and
magnitude’ of the burden the State’s rule imposes on those
rights against the interests the State contends justify that
burden, and consider[ing] the extent to which the State’s
139
concerns make the burden necessary.”
provided for partisan offices in section 204D.10, subdivision 2, and for
nonpartisan offices in section 204B.13, subdivision 4.
MINN. STAT. § 204B.04 (2004).
132
See Twin Cities Area New Party, 863 F. Supp. at 988. The First
Amendment applies to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
clause. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). (“It is
beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.”).
133
See id. at 994.
134
See Twin Cities Area New Party, 73 F.3d at 200.
135
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 356.
136
Brief for the Respondent at 12, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351 (No. 95-1608).
137
Id.
138
See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 357-58.
139
See id. at 358.
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The Supreme Court conceded that fusion bans interfere
with minor parties’ associational rights, but the Court did not
find the burden to be severe.140 To be sure, the Minnesota
statute would prevent the New Party from having its preferred
candidate listed on the ballot, but it would not prohibit the
party from campaigning and supporting a candidate.141 Even if
the ballot restriction limited the party’s ability to send a
message to voters and to its preferred candidate, the Court was
not convinced that a party had a right to use the ballot to send
a message to voters.142 The Court explained, “[b]allots serve
primarily to elect candidates, not as forums for political
expression.”143 Adhering to Burdick, the Court declined to
acknowledge any constitutional protection for the expressive
value of voting.144
Finding that the anti-fusion law did not severely burden
minor parties, the Court held that the state did not need to
survive strict scrutiny analysis in order be valid. The state
articulated four reasons to justify the law: avoiding voter
confusion, promoting candidate competition, preventing
electoral distortions and ballot manipulations, and
discouraging party splintering and unrestrained factionalism.145
After declaring these justifications sufficient to support
Minnesota’s law, the Court introduced an additional reason to
justify the ban on fusion, one that had not been raised by the
state. For the first time, the Court declared that a state’s
interest in the stability of its political structure allowed it to
enact legislation promoting the two-party system.146
Building on previous cases that acknowledged a state’s
interest in the stability of its government,147 the majority said
that to achieve that goal, state laws could favor the two-party
system.148 Although this was a new approach to election law for
the Court, the opinion devoted relatively little space to the
exploration of how fusion threatened the two-party system or
how the two-party system encouraged stability.149 With
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

See id. at 363.
See id. at 358-59.
Id.
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363 (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438).
See id. See also supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 364.
See id. at 367.
Eu, 489 U.S. at 226; Storer, 415 U.S. at 736.
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 367-68.
See id.
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references to James Madison’s fear of factions, the decision
declared that states are permitted to enact laws that favor the
two-party system in order to “temper the destabilizing effects of
party-splintering and excessive factionalism.”150
The majority’s unsolicited defense of the two-party
system was contrary to the Court’s past political party
jurisprudence. In Williams, the Court had implied that
protecting the major parties would not sufficiently justify
infringement on a minor party’s associational rights.151 At oral
arguments for Timmons, it is no wonder that counsel and
courtroom observers were surprised by Justice Scalia’s
questioning on the protection of the two-party system.152 When
it looked like counsel for Minnesota was not willing to admit
anti-fusion laws were intended to protect the major parties,
Justice Scalia interjected: “Well, you wouldn’t concede the
major point, would you, that there is something wrong about
the state establishing its electoral machinery . . . to facilitate
and encourage a two-party system . . . ?”153 Justice Scalia
proceeded to guide counsel to argue that states should be able
to choose whether and in what way they will protect the major
parties, a point which, admittedly, counsel had not planned to
assert.154
In dissent, Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter
argued that the Court should not have considered this
justification, since the state had never raised it.155 Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, suggested that the
protection of the two-party system was the “true basis” for the
majority’s decision against the New Party and argued that
even if the state had properly raised this justification, it would
have been insufficient.156 In their view, the risks of government
instability resulting from fusion voting were speculative, and
150

See id. at 368 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)).
Associations have great power and if not checked, Madison thought, associations could
destroy popular government by implementing policies in opposition to the will and
benefit of the majority. Indirect elections of the senate, the Electoral College and the
tripartite nature of the federal government were designed to shield against the dangers
of factions. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). See also infra note 229 and
accompanying text.
151
Williams, 393 U.S. at 23.
152
See SIFRY, supra note 24, at 297.
153
Transcript of oral argument at 25-26, Timmons, 520 U.S. 351, No. 95-1608,
1996 WL 709359 (U.S. Oral. Arg. Dec. 4, 1996).
154
See id. at 26-29.
155
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 377-78 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Ginsburg
joining, Justice Souter joining in part).
156
See id.
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the burden created by anti-fusion laws demanded a greater
demonstration of threat.157 Unlike Justice Stevens, Justice
Souter believed that anti-fusion laws might be justified based
on a state interest of protecting the two-party system.158 To
satisfy constitutional scrutiny, however, Justice Souter would
have had the state demonstrate that fusion voting would, in
fact, threaten the two-party system and that the disintegration
of the two-party system would risk state instability. As the
state had failed to do this, Justice Souter would not have
upheld the law.159
The New Party’s day in court came and went, and a
revival of fusion voting now seemed permanently buried in
America’s electoral graveyard. State constitutions, however,
have the ability to revive constitutional issues that the
Supreme Court has killed.
IV.

CHALLENGING ANTI-FUSION LAWS BASED ON STATE
CONSTITUTIONS

A.

Protecting Rights through State Constitutions

State constitutions are wholly independent documents;
they are not drafted to echo the federal Constitution.160 In fact,
many state constitutions were written and ratified prior to the
federal Constitution.161 Framers of the federal Constitution
decided to have the Bill of Rights apply only to the federal
government because they believed that state constitutions
sufficiently protected citizens from state governments.162 Even
those state constitutions that were written after the adoption of
the federal Bill of Rights borrowed from the language of the
existing state constitutions more than from the federal
Constitution.163 This history leads many scholars and jurists to
agree with Justice William Brennan’s conclusion that “the
decisions of the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be,

157

See id.
See id. at 383 (Souter, J., dissenting).
159
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 384 (Souter, J., dissenting).
160
See JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 1-3(a) (3d ed. 2000).
161
See id.
162
Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction to TOWARD A USABLE
PAST: LIBERTY UNDER STATE CONSTITUTIONS 5 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb
eds., 1991).
163
See FRIESEN, supra note 160, § 5-2.
158
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dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by
counterpart provisions of state law.”164
Although state courts are free to interpret their
constitutions without reference to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the federal Constitution, many courts look to
the Supreme Court for guidance.165 Especially in the area of
civil rights, Supreme Court decisions have influenced the scope
of state constitutional protection for individual rights.166 There
are exceptions. Some provisions of state constitutions are
unique to the states and do not have federal counterparts.167
State courts are left to understand the meaning of
constitutional guarantees to public education, for instance,
without direction from the Supreme Court.168 Furthermore, for
the first hundred and fifty years of Supreme Court
jurisprudence, state governments were not limited by the
federal Bill of Rights.169 Courts intent on curbing abusive state
action relied on their state, not federal, constitution.170

164

William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977). Supreme Court decisions similarly
acknowledge the independent nature of state constitutions. See, e.g., Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (“[A state may] adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal
Constitution.”). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36
SW. L.J. 951 (1982); Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn
From Their Children”: Interpreting State Constitutions In An Age of Global
Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633 (2004); Robert F. Williams, The Third State of
the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211 (2003).
165
See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 48 (1998).
166
See id.
167
See FRIESEN, supra note 160, § 1-3(b).
168
See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XI § 1; Bd. Of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E. 2d 359,
368-69 (1982) (interpreting the constitutional requirement of “free and common
schools” to mean the legislature must provide a “sound basic” public education). Almost
every state constitution guarantees its citizens an education, whereas the federal
Constitution does not provide a right to an education. See Peter Enrich, Leaving
Equality Behind: New Directs in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 105
(1995). In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973), that disparities in education financing do not violate the U.S.
Constitution, numerous state courts held that their own constitutions require greater
equity in school financing. See Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877
P.2d 806, 814 (Ariz. 1994) (listing cases).
169
The Supreme Court did not apply the First Amendment to the action of
state governments until 1925. See supra note 108.
170
For example, in 1859, Wisconsin declared that government appointed
counsel for indigent defendants was part of the right to fair trial guaranteed by the
state constitution. See Carpenter v. Dane County, 9 Wis. 274 (1859). More than a
century later, the U.S. Supreme Court took a similar position. See Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson,
Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951 (1982).
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Over the last several decades, state courts have revived
a practice of independent interpretations of their constitutions,
finding greater protections for individual rights than those
provided by the federal Constitution.171 Even state
constitutional provisions that mirror language in the federal
Constitution have been interpreted as more expansive than the
federal Constitution.172 For instance, after the U.S. Supreme
Court upheld a state’s sodomy law in Bowers v. Hardwick
against a right to privacy challenge,173 the Georgia court struck
down its state’s sodomy law based on the Georgia constitution’s
right to privacy.174
This Note explores state constitutional law generally as
it applies to fusion voting, but each state’s constitution
deserves its own analysis. That being said, there are shared
characteristics of state constitutional law that make anti-fusion
laws vulnerable to state constitutional challenges even though
a federal challenge failed. First, there is an absence of
federalism concerns when state courts are interpreting state
constitutions.175 This means state courts may adopt a less
deferential approach in analyzing state legislatures’
justifications for anti-fusion laws. Second, the history of state
constitutional development reflects dedication to broad and
diverse political participation.176 This conception of politics may
mean minor political parties receive more protection under
state constitutions than under the federal Constitution.
Finally, several state courts have articulated a broader
interpretation of freedom of expression than the Supreme
Court has found in the federal Constitution.177 This means state

171

See Ken Gormley, The Silver Anniversary of New Judicial Federalism, 66
ALB. L. REV. 797 (2003).
172
The Maryland courts, for example, have “emphasized that, simply because
a Maryland constitutional provision is in pari materia with a federal one or has a
federal counterpart, does not mean that the provision will always be interpreted or
applied in the same manner as its federal counterpart.” Dua v. Comcast Cable of
Maryland, Inc., 805 A.2d 1061, 1071 (Md. 2002).
173
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
174
Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998). The Georgia Court relied on
language of the state constitution that is almost identical to the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment in the federal Constitution. Id. at 21. Compare U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”) with GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1 (“No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”).
175
See infra Part IV.B.
176
See infra Part IV.C.
177
See infra Part IV.D.
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courts may adopt a more protective approach to rights of
associations and the value of voting.
B.

The Strength of State Court Judicial Review

In Timmons, as in other election law cases, the Supreme
Court balanced a state’s role as regulator with a party’s rights
of association. Acceptance of state justifications in this
balancing act are in keeping with a general reluctance of
federal courts to interfere with the way a state “defines itself as
a sovereign.”178 State courts, for obvious reasons, need not be
concerned about disrespecting the sovereignty of their own
state. Without federalism concerns, deference to the political
branches need not be as extreme as it is in the federal courts.179
This is particularly true when state courts face claims from a
minority of the population, who by their very numbers will
never have control of the legislature.
Some state constitutions explicitly authorize judicial
review of state legislation.180 While federal courts rely on
precedent to support their powers of judicial review, they are
cautious in exercising that power, especially when asked to
invalidate legislative actions.181 State courts, however, have
178

See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (regarding state decisions
on the qualification of elected officers).
179
For an argument that state courts should employ strict scrutiny in the field
of constitutional economic rights, see Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State
Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131
(1999).
180
See Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and Evolution of Positive Rights,
20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 900 (1988). For example, the Georgia Constitution provides
“Legislative acts in violation of this Constitution or the Constitution of the United
States are void, and the judiciary shall so declare them.” GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 5.
The judiciary articles of other states’ constitutions similarly declare the power of
judicial review, although often less explicitly or with limitations. See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST.
art. 6, § 2 (“The Supreme Court . . . shall not declare any law unconstitutional except
when sitting in banc.”); LA. CONST. art. V, § 5, para. D (“In addition to other appeals
provided by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if a law
or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional.”); NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2 (“The judges
of the Supreme Court, sitting without division, shall hear and determine all cases
involving the constitutionality of a statute.”); UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The court
shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution
of the United States, except on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the
Supreme Court.”); VA. CONST. § 1, para. 2 (“[T]he Supreme Court shall, by virtue of this
Constitution, have appellate jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of a
law under this Constitution or the Constitution of the United States and in cases
involving the life or liberty of any person.”).
181
See Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A
Constitutional Census of the 1990’s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 440 (1997) (“The
[Supreme] Court is most deferential to legislative enactments that can claim the
broadest democratic pedigree.”). See generally William G. Ross, The Resilience of
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enhanced legitimacy in reviewing legislation because they act
according to explicit state constitutional provisions.182 In
addition, many state court judges are elected, so their role in
reviewing legislative action is less subject to charges of antimajoritarianism.183 In fact, when states amended their
constitutions to allow for the popular election of judges, they
simultaneously limited the power granted to the legislature,
intending that judges should help “make public policy.”184
Therefore, when reviewing anti-fusion laws, state courts carry
with them more than just substantive law to find the laws
invalid. They are also, perhaps more importantly, draped with
a cloak of legitimacy.
The Timmons opinion allows states broad power to
enact laws that protect the major parties. State courts
interpreting state constitutions in response to a challenge to
anti-fusion laws would be more critical of the state’s
justification than the Supreme Court was in Timmons. If state
courts accept that there is a constitutionally permissible
interest in protecting the two-party system, a more rigorous
analysis would likely strike down anti-fusion laws because
there is a striking lack of evidence to support the claim that
fusion destroys the two-party system. Rather, New York’s
experience suggests fusion voting creates a “modified two-party
system,” where minor parties play an important role but do not
replace the major parties.185
Perhaps more importantly, there is a lack of evidence to
show that stable democracy requires limiting the number of
major parties to two. State constitutions protect broad
participation in electoral government,186 and courts scrutinizing
the justification of anti-fusion laws should find the state’s
protection of major parties suspect and inconsistent with state
constitutional conceptions of popular sovereignty.

Marbury v. Madison: Why Judicial Review Has Survived So Many Attacks, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 733 (2003) (describing the challenges to federal court review of state
legislation).
182
Neuborne, supra note 180, at 900.
183
See TARR, supra note 165, at 174-75 (suggesting that the election of state
judges may explain why the legitimacy of state courts is less questioned than that of
the U.S. Supreme Court).
184
See id. at 122.
185
MAZMANIAN, supra note 78, at 115 (“New York State has a highly
competitive party system with two major contenders and third party contestants that
are able to sustain themselves over time.”).
186
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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Political Participation Protected in State Constitutions

Compared to the federal Constitution, state
constitutions are extremely specific regarding their dedication
to political participation. The first article of many state
constitutions is a declaration of commitment to popular
sovereignty.187 For instance, Article I, section I of the
Washington constitution announces, “All political power is
inherent in the people, and governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to
protect and maintain individual rights.”188
In addition, many state constitutions explicitly provide
for the right to vote.189 This is dramatically different than the
federal Constitution, which may prohibit discriminatory denial
of the right to vote, but “does not confer the right of suffrage
upon any one.”190 State constitutions typically have language
similar to the Pennsylvania constitution: “Elections shall be
free and equal; and no power, civil or military, shall at any
time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of
suffrage.”191 The right to vote has been one of the state
constitutional
rights
most
frequently
expanded
by
192
States have similarly demonstrated their
amendment.
187

See Tarr, supra note 165, at 11-12. See, e.g., N.H. Const. art. I (“All men
are born equally free and independent; therefore, all government of right originates
from the people, is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.”); N.J.
CONST. art. I (“All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain
natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and
obtaining safety and happiness.”);WIS. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are born equally
free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted,
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”).
188
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
189
See James A. Gardner, A Post-Vieth Strategy For Litigating Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims, ELECTION L.J. 643, 648 nn.37, 38 (summarizing states’
provisions on elections).
190
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874).
191
PENN. CONST. art I, § 5. See also, e.g., IND. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“All elections
shall be free and equal.”); S.D. CONST. art. VI, sec. 19 (“Elections shall be free and
equal, and no power, civil or military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the free
exercise of the right of suffrage.”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“That elections shall be free
and equal, and the right of suffrage, as hereinafter declared, shall never be denied to
any person entitled thereto, except upon a conviction by a jury of some infamous crime,
previously ascertained and declared by law, and judgment thereon by court of
competent jurisdiction.”).
192
See TARR, supra note 165, at 105-08. There is a major exception to this
trend of broadening the right to vote through constitutional revisions: In many
southern states constitutional amendments were used to disenfranchise African
Americans during the end of the Nineteenth Century. See id. at 107.
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commitment to popular sovereignty by amending their
constitutions to create procedures for referendum, initiative,
and recall elections.193
Constitutional amendments expanding the voting
population and permitting direct democracy were adopted in
response to fears of government corruption.194 Drafters believed
that the “main threats to rights, both collective and individual,
were despotic officials and those seeking special privileges,
rather than the people as a whole.”195 Thus, state constitutions
reflect cynicism of the motives of government officials and they
aim to prevent manipulation of the electoral system that
protects the power of the few.196 Like Madison’s fear of factions,
drafters of state constitutions worried that minorities could
impede the will of the majority.197 In contrast to Madison,
however, the minorities the state constitutional drafters
worried about were the ones elected to positions of power, not
the ones advocating for political change.198
When parties first began challenging election
regulations, state courts were concerned with the rights of
voters, not parties.199 Decisions from the late 1800s and early
1900s expressed distress over corruption by party leaders and
party bosses.200 Judges believed manipulative political parties
hampered political participation.201 For some judges, distrust of
political parties was an argument in favor of fusion voting,
since “[p]olitical fusions among minority parties often serve as
a check upon arrogant majority parties, or rather political
193

JAMES QUAYLE DEALEY, GROWTH OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 14749, 169-71, 215-18 (1972).
194
See TARR, supra note 165, at 170 (“[T]he initiative does provide a
mechanism for circumventing the power of political elites within state government, just
as its early proponents had expected.”); Gardner, supra note 189, at 649 (“Progressives
. . . sought to reform state and local government by creating institutions of direct
democracy, such as the initiative, referendum, and recall election, which would allow
ordinary voters to thwart plans by incumbent power-holders to serve their own
interests and to assure their own continuation in office.”).
195
TARR, supra note 165, at 78. More recently, this logic has motivated
constitutional amendments providing for term limits for elected offices. See id. at 170,
172.
196
Cf. Gardner, supra note 189, at 649-50 (arguing that state constitutions’
focus on electoral responsiveness suggests partisan gerrymandering claims may be
advanced under state constitutions).
197
See supra note 150.
198
See TARR, supra note 165, at 78, 100, 150-51.
199
See Adam Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs: Early Political
Party Regulation in the State Courts, 1886-1915, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 892 (2000).
200
See id. at 890.
201
See id. at 875.
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parties whose thorough organization has enabled them to
202
repeatedly elect officers that are dishonest and corrupt.” Most
judges facing early cases on fusion voting, however, did not
203
consider the impact anti-fusion laws had on minor parties.
Professor Adam Winkler notes that in an era of genuine party
competition it is “easy to understand how the courts overlooked
the duopoly-enhancing nature of many turn-of-the-century
204
reforms.”
History now shows that anti-fusion laws were enacted
to protect the political parties in power and they succeeded far
205
better than they could have hoped. In Timmons, the Supreme
Court was willing to allow states to purposefully favor two
major parties, but state constitutions would not provide that
leeway. State constitutions are drafted to prevent laws that are
enacted to protect the privileges of the elected. Unless current
legislators can defend anti-fusion laws with less partisan
motives than those of the past, this manipulation of the
electoral scheme should not only fail to justify such laws, it
should result in their invalidity.
D.

Freedom of Expression Protected in State Constitutions

Like the federal Constitution, state constitutions
contain specific provisions protecting freedom of speech and
assembly.206 In the resurgence of state constitutional law of the
last twenty-five years, freedom of expression has been one of
the most watched areas.207 Several courts have held that their
202

State ex rel. Dunn v. Coburn, 168 S.W. 956, 964 (Mo. 1914) (Brown, J.,

dissenting).
203

Early court challenges to anti-fusion voting laws were generally brought as
claims under state constitutional rights to vote by ballot, and rights of free and equal
elections. See, e.g., Dunn, 168 S.W. at 964; State ex rel. Runge v. Anderson, 76 N.W.
482 (Wis. 1898); State ex rel. Bateman v. Bode, 45 N.E. 195 (Ohio 1896); State ex rel.
Sturdevant v. Allen, 62 N.W. 35 (Neb. 1895). This note explores modern challenges to
anti-fusion laws based on freedom of expression and association, but even future
challenges based on the right to vote are not precluded by these cases. The value of
competition in the electoral arena may play a different role in challenges to anti-fusion
laws brought today, as opposed to ones brought a century ago since the context of
elections has changed dramatically. Cf. Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs,
supra note 199, at 892-95 (describing party competition at the turn of the century).
204
See Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 892.
205
See Argersinger, supra note 33, at 288.
206
See Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for
a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U. L. REV. 125 (1969) (listing the states with freedom of speech,
freedom of assembly and other Bill of Rights’ provisions in their constitutions).
207
See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Expressive Liberties in the State Courts:
Their Permissible Reach and Sanctioned Restraints, 67 ALB. L. REV. 655 (2004); Seth F.
Kreimer, The Pennsylvania Constitution’s Protection of Free Expression, 5 U. PA. J.
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state constitutions provide a broader right to free expression
than the federal Constitution.208 This suggests state protections
for expression may cover a broader range of activities than the
First Amendment, specifically, the activities of voting and
association.
The earliest state constitutions were drafted during the
American Revolutionary war.209 Almost all included guarantees
of freedom of speech.210 This is hardly surprising given the
resentment towards British attempts to limit expression in the
colonies.211 Freedom of expression was seen as having “a direct
relationship to freedom from government oppression.”212 State
courts have relied on this history in finding state constitutional
law protects a wide range of expressive activities.213 Of course,
some states drafted constitutions after the adoption of the
federal Bill of Rights.214 But those states borrowed the broad
language of older state constitutions in protecting free speech,
instead of copying the federal Constitution.215
Forty-one state constitutions protect the right of
expression with affirmative avowals of the right to speak.216
CONST. L. 12 (2002); Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions
and Protection of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305 (1985).
208
See, e.g., People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059, 1066 (Colo. 1989) (“[O]ur
constitution extends broader protection to freedom of expression than does the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.”). See also infra notes 213, 226 and
accompanying text.
209
See TARR, supra note 165, at 61 (providing a table of states constitutions
and the date of their adoption).
210
See Margaret A. Blanchard, Filling the Void: Speech and Press in State
Courts prior to Gitlow in THE FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES
ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS 17 (Bill F. Chamberlin &
Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982).
211
See id. at 21.
212
See id.
213
For example, in Pennsylvania, the highest court has paid special attention
to the history of the Pennsylvania’s founder, William Penn, in analyzing the text of its
constitution:
[Since] William Penn[] was prosecuted in England for the “crime” of
preaching to an unlawful assembly and persecuted by the court for daring to
proclaim his right to a trial by an uncoerced jury . . . [i]t is small wonder . . .
the rights of freedom of speech, assembly, and petition have been guaranteed
since the first Pennsylvania Constitution, not simply as restrictions on the
powers of government, as found in the Federal Constitution, but as inherent
and “invaluable” rights of man.
Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1388 (Pa. 1981).
214
See TARR, supra note 165, at 61.
215
See FRIESEN, supra note 160, § 5-2. Today, every state provides for the
rights of speech in their constitution. See Force, supra note 206, at 125.
216
For a listing of state free speech and press provisions, see FRIESEN, supra
note 160, at app. 5 and Note, Private Abridgement of Speech and the State
Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 180-81 n.79 (1980).
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Kansas’ constitution provides, “The liberty of the press shall be
inviolate; and all persons may freely speak, write or publish
their sentiments on all subjects.”217 Similarly, the Michigan
constitution says, “Every person may freely speak, write,
express and publish his views on all subjects.”218 These
provisions are typical.219
Forty-six states have provisions guaranteeing the right
to assembly220 and these provisions are often expressed as
positive declarations as well. Using Kansas and Michigan as
examples once again, Kansas’ constitution provides, “The
people have the right to assemble, in a peaceable manner, to
consult for their common good, to instruct their
representatives, and to petition the government, or any
department thereof, for the redress of grievances.”221 The
langauge of the Michigan constituion is nearly identical.222
Although these provisions of state constitutions protect
a right similar to the First Amendment of the federal
Constitution, their distinct language implies they deserve a
distinct analysis.223 Most state constitutional provisions are in
sharp contrast to the federal Constitution, which simply
declares that “Congress shall make no law” restraining
expressive rights,224 and does not provide a positive guarantee.
The affirmative nature of the state provisions illustrates the
spirit in which they were enacted, celebrating the fundamental
rights of state citizens of which freedom of speech was a
priority.225 Relying on this, some states have found that under
217

KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 11.
MICH. CONST. art. I § 5.
219
See FRIESEN, supra note 160, at app. 5.
220
See Force, supra note 206, at 139.
221
KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights § 3.
222
See MICH. CONST. art. I § 5 (“The people have a right to peaceably to
assemble, to consult of the common good, to instruct their representatives and petition
the government for redress of grievance.”).
223
See Kevin Francis O’Neill, The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions as an
Alternative Source of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1,
31 (1993) (“If a court were interpreting contractual terms, would it conclude, as readily
as some courts have, that these clauses are coextensive?”).
224
The First Amendment in the federal Constitution reads, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
225
See Todd F. Simon, Independent but Inadequate: State Constitutions and
Protections of Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 310 (1985) (“Freedom of
the press was considered the right of greatest importance, at least initially, and
assuring freedom of expression was a primary concern of settlers in new states.”).
218
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their constitutions infringements of the rights of speech can
occur when there is no state action.226 In New Jersey, for
instance, state courts have relied on the affirmative nature of
the free speech provision to hold that the state constitution
provides a right to distribute political leaflets in shopping
centers even though the federal Constitution would not provide
that right.227
A broad right to freedom of expression is valuable in
challenging anti-fusion laws for two reasons. First, freedom of
association is an offshoot of freedom of expression, so the scope
of protection for speech is indicative of the protection
associations will be given. Second, voting is an expressive act.
Freedom of expression in the federal Constitution does not
protect the act of voting,228 but freedom of expression in state
constitutions should.
1. Broad Right of Expression Protects Associations
The rights of political parties are in essence the rights of
voters who have collectivized in order to engage in more
efficient expression. Since state constitutional language and
history suggest broader protection for expression than the
federal Constitution, state constitutions should be construed to
provide greater protection for associational rights of political
parties.
Although political parties did not exist at the time the
federal Constitution was drafted, its framers sought to guard
against the danger of “factions,” which James Madison defined
as groups of citizens “united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest.”229 The Supreme Court,
therefore, was understandably slow in developing a freedom of
association doctrine to protect the very group activity Madison

226
N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650
A.2d 757, 771 (N.J. 1993) (“[T]he State right of free speech is protected not only from
abridgement by government, but also from unreasonably restrictive and oppressive
conduct by private entities.”).
227
See id. at 770-71.
228
See supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
229
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). Similarly, of the DemocraticRepublican societies forming in 1794, George Washington said, “All combinations and
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct,
control, counteract or awe the regular deliberation and action of the constituted
authorities are . . . of fatal tendency.” ROBERT J. BRESLER, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
23 (2004) (quoting President George Washington, Farewell Address to the People of the
United States (Sept. 17, 1796), in INDEP. CHRON., Sept. 26, 1796).
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feared.230 State courts, however, were quicker to recognize the
democratic value and necessity of associations.231 Half a century
before the Supreme Court said there was constitutional
protection for associations, state courts had recognized that
political parties are protected under fundamental rights of
speech and assembly.232 The highest court of California wrote in
1900,
No one, it would seem, can be so thoughtless as not to realize that
government by the people is a progressive institution, which seeks to
give expression and effect to the wisest and best ideas of its
members. . . . [E]lectors . . . may freely assemble, organize
themselves into a political party, and use all legitimate means to
carry their principles of government into active operation through
the suffrages of their fellows. Such a right is fundamental.233

Similarly the Wisconsin Supreme court declared in 1910
that “[t]he right of members of a political party to freely
assemble, deliberate and act, to promote the interest of such
party, is a right guaranteed by the Constitution, state and
national. Freedom to do those things, reasonably appropriate to
the effective maintenance of party organization, cannot be
abridged.”234 While acknowledging constitutional protections for
political parties, state courts also allowed state legislatures to
regulate them. Political parties, these courts recognized, are
more than private associations. They are part of the machinery
of democracy.235 State courts upheld Australian ballot laws and
other reforms, not because they rejected the constitutional
rights of parties, but rather because they believed electoral
regulations would increase voter choice and opportunity.236
These courts sustained regulations that they thought would
protect the rights of voters to participate effectively in party
organizations.237
230

See BRESLER, supra note 229, at 25, 32.
The fact that state courts considered the rights of political parties before
the U.S. Supreme Court is likely a result of the historical development of the
incorporation doctrine. It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court applied the First
Amendment to state action. See supra note 108.
232
See Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 874.
233
See Britton v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs. of San Francisco, 61 P. 1115, 1117
(Ca. 1900).
234
See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 976-77 (Wis.
1910).
235
See Winkler, Voters’ Rights and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 881-82.
236
See id. at 884 (“Protecting and preserving the ability of voters to make
effective use of electoral opportunities free from the corrupting influence of party
leaders led most state courts to uphold laws restricting ballot access.”).
237
See People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm., 58 N.E. 124, 125-26
231
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Today, anti-fusion laws limit voter choice rather than
ensure it. By preventing parties and their supporters from
nominating their selected candidates, anti-fusion laws run
afoul of a long tradition of state protection for voter
participation as expressed through political parties.
2. Broad Right of Expression Protects the Act of Voting
In addition to association as a derivative right of
freedom of speech, freedom of expression on its own might
prohibit anti-fusion laws. As discussed above, voting may be
considered an expressive act.238 Using the facts of Timmons as
an example, New Party members wanted to vote for Andy
Dawkins on the New Party ballot line to express a message
that they felt would not be expressed by voting for him on the
Democratic-Farmer-Labor ballot line, namely, that the
Democratic Party was too centrist.239 That the medium for this
voter communiqué would be the ballot does not change its
essential expressive nature.
The majority of the U.S. Supreme Court in Timmons
rejected the link between voting and expression. State courts,
however, are free to take another approach. No trend of
protection for the expressive nature of voting has yet emerged
in state courts, but there are promising harbingers. Several
states have found state constitutional protection for write-in
votes, for instance.240 Recently, the Utah Supreme Court
described the constitutional right to vote for a ballot initiative
as important because it “encourages political dialogue” as well
as “allows the general populace to have substantive and
meaningful participation in enacting legislation.”241 Oregon’s
Judge Landau has gone further in acknowledging the ballot as
a place of expression. In Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury,
(N.Y. 1900) (upholding a statute that the court believed was intended to “permit the
voters to construct the organization from the bottom upwards, instead of permitting
[party] leaders to construct it from the top downwards”). See Winkler, Voters’ Rights
and Parties’ Wrongs, supra note 199, at 880 (quoting this and other cases from the
period).
238
See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
239
See DISCH, supra note 10, at 17-18.
240
See Littlejohn v. People ex rel. Desch, 121 P. 159 (Colo. 1912); Smith v.
Smathers, 372 SO. 2d 427 (Fla. 1979); Thompson v. Wilson, 155 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. 1967).
Even though these cases have protected write-in votes under the right to vote, and not
under freedom of expression, they suggest state constitutions differ in their
understanding of the value of voting from the federal Constitution. See supra notes 92100 and accompanying text.
241
Gallivan v. Walker, 54 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2002).
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the Oregon Court of Appeals considered the constitutionality of
a statute preventing the Freedom Socialist Party from using
their party name on the ballot because the Socialist party
already had been given an exclusive right to the use of its name
and the word “socialist.”242 In a concurring opinion, Judge
Landau found the statute limited the ability of a political party
to communicate its message to the public, and this was a
violation the Oregon constitutional right to free speech.243
State constitutions value voting more than the federal
Constitution.244 Moreover, they offer more protection for
expressive activities. Therefore, state courts should understand
voting as an act of expression. Fusion voting is especially
motivated by an urge to express one’s political views. As
recognized by Justice Stevens, fusion allows voters to indicate
views they feel are not sufficiently represented by the major
parties, while still allowing them to vote for the candidate they
hope will win the election.245 Fusion voting, then, should receive
constitutional protection as part of states’ protection of
expression.
V.

CONCLUSION

Legislators enacted anti-fusion laws in order to ensure
their reelections, not as part of a noble defense of government
stability. In Timmons, the Supreme Court declared states have
the right to enact such laws to protect the two-party system.
State courts interpreting state constitutions should treat
challenges to anti-fusion laws differently. Drafters of state
constitutions
were
dedicated
to
expansive
political
participation and were cynical of elected power. Sustaining
laws that have the purpose of limiting the viability of minor
parties reduces voter choice and shields established politicians
from challenges. Anti-fusion laws, then, are incompatible with
the goals of state constitutions. Moreover, protection of the twoparty system is an especially weak defense for these laws in
242

Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury, 48 P.3d 199, 200 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
The majority found the statute unconstitutional under the federal Constitution’s First
Amendment and never addressed whether there was a state constitutional violation,
noting that parties did not a raise a state constitutional issue on appeal. See id. at 201
n.2.
243
See id. at 208 (Landau, J., concurring) (“[T]he statute prohibits a political
party from using specified words in communicating a message to members of the voting
public.”).
244
See supra Part IV.C.
245
Timmons, 520 U.S. at 381 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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states that value free expression. Anti-fusion laws infringe
upon the rights of voters to express their political beliefs and
the rights of parties and their adherents to associate.
Many voters are unhappy with their choices on Election
Day but anti-fusion laws allow them no satisfying options.
They can “hold their nose” and vote for the candidate they
believe is the lesser of two evils246 or they can cast a vote that is
unlikely to translate into actual political power. A revival of
fusion voting would solve this dilemma, but after the Timmons
opinion was issued, a revival of fusion voting appeared
unlikely. Examining state constitutions reveals a different
future—anti-fusion laws are not as unassailable as they may
seem. State courts have the ability, authority and obligation to
invalidate anti-fusion laws and thereby liberate voters and
parties alike.

Elissa Berger†
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See Press Release, Repentant Nader Voter Pac, Former Nader Voters
Offering their Compatriots Nose Clips, So They “Hold Your Nose and Vote” for Kerry
(Aug. 10, 2004), at http://www.repentantnadervoter.com/mediacenter/holdyour
nose.htm.
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Appendix:
HYPOTHETICAL BALLOT IN A FUSION VOTING SYSTEM
BALLOT
Make your selection by filling in one of the circles.
Party
Candidate
for Office

Democrat

Republican

Purple

Candidate X

Candidate Y

Candidate X

HYPOTHETICAL ELECTIONS RESULTS
Votes for Candidate Y as Republican ...............................................48%
Votes for Candidate X as Democrat ..................................................44%
Votes for Candidate X as Purple .........................................................8%

Candidate X is declared the winner with 52% of the
vote.
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